The optimal delivery time and order quantity in an oligopoly market with time-sensitive customers

Autoři: Haijiao Li aff001;  Weijin Xu aff001;  Kuan Yang aff001
Působiště autorů: School of Business Adminstration, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan, China aff001;  Supply Chain and Logistics Optimization Research Central, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada aff002
Vyšlo v časopise: PLoS ONE 14(12)
Kategorie: Research Article


With the development of e-commerce, delivery time is regarded as a key competitive advantage in an oligopoly market, as shortening the delivery time can stimulate demand for products. Many firms adopt a variety of strategies to shorten delivery time, and holding sufficient inventory is reported as an effective way. This study integrates a market share attraction model based on delivery time competition with the traditional inventory model to determine the optimal delivery time and order quantity. With the use of supermodular game method, we investigate the effect of changes in marketing and operations factors on the equilibrium delivery time and order quantity in non-dominated and dominated oligopolistic markets. The results reveal that the equilibrium delivery time and order quantity exhibit a directional response to changes in marketing and operations factors, and the response differs between the non-dominated oligopoly and the dominated oligopoly. Furthermore, under a cooperative oligopolistic market with asymmetry, it is beneficial for the firms with high competitive strength to adopt the delivery time strategy, but it fails to do so for the firm with the low competitive strength. Lastly, numerical analysis suggests that marketing factors play a more important role in affecting equilibrium measures than operations factors.

Klíčová slova:

Economics – Ellipsoids – Game theory – Marketing – Monopolies – Structure of markets – Oligopolies – Factorial design


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