The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism


Autoři: Alfred M. Wu aff001
Působiště autorů: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore aff001
Vyšlo v časopise: PLoS ONE 14(12)
Kategorie: Research Article
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0225299

Souhrn

Without election or re-election motivations, what factors have impacted public goods preferences in an authoritarian country such as China? More specifically, what makes political elites be devoted to or not be devoted to local public goods provision? This study, using basic education provision as an example, intends to gauge the impact of leadership selection on public goods provision in China. It is found that career trajectories of politicians have a bearing on basic education provision. The findings suggest that even under a top-down appointment system, homegrown politicians are more willing to cater to local preferences, especially on basic education provision, which suggests an extension of Riker’s theory, applied in a non-democratic regime. Numerous studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on a variety of aspects of public governance in different contexts. Nevertheless, the unique contribution of this study is its policy implication that political centralization may not be an effective solution for local public governance even in an authoritarian context.

Klíčová slova:

Careers – Economic development – Economics – Employment – China – Teachers – Political theory – Local governments


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2019 Číslo 12