Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment


Autoři: Mathieu Lefebvre aff001;  Anne Stenger aff002
Působiště autorů: BETA- University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France aff001;  INRA and BETA- University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France aff002
Vyšlo v časopise: PLoS ONE 15(1)
Kategorie: Research Article
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0227360

Souhrn

Using a common experimental framework, this paper addresses both the question of the short-term and the long-lasting effects of temporary monetary and non-monetary incentive mechanisms on increasing individual contributions to the public good. The results show that both punishments and rewards significantly increase contributions compared to the baseline, but that monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, whereas non-monetary sanctions lead to the lowest contributions. The four types of incentives display long-lasting effects, i.e., contributions do not go back to baseline levels directly after the withdrawal of the incentives. However, rewards appear to have much stronger persistent effects than sanctions, revealing some sort of delayed reciprocity.

Klíčová slova:

Conservation of energy – Conservation science – Experimental design – Experimental economics – Habits – Public goods game – Social psychology – Environmental economics


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2020 Číslo 1